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Abstract
Constant price impact functions, much used in financial literature,
are shown to give rise to paradoxical outcomes since they do not allow
for proper predictability removal: for instance the exploitation of a sin-
gle large trade whose size and time of execution are known in advance
to some insider leaves the arbitrage opportunity unchanged, which
allows arbitrage exploitation multiple times. We argue that chain ar-
bitrage exploitation should not exist, which provides an a contrario
consistency criterion. Remarkably, all the stocks investigated in Paris
Stock Exchange have dynamically consistent price impact functions.
Both the bid-ask spread and the feedback of sequential same-side mar-
ket orders onto both sides of the order book are essential to ensure
consistency at the smallest time scale.
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1 Introduction
There are several starting points for studying financial market dynamics the-
oretically. The most common approach consists in assuming that the actions
of traders and external news result collectively into rather unpredictable price
fluctuations. This view, dating back at least to Bachelier (1900), is the basis
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama 1970), which states more
precisely that there is no risk-free arbitrage, thus, that it should be impossible
to consistently outperform the market. In practice, for the sake of simplicity,
it is usual to assume that the price evolution is completely unpredictable,
i.e., to model it as a random walk. This is of course very convenient for
elaborating option pricing theories (Hull 2005). Behavioural finance starts
from EMH and incorporates deviations from rational expectations in the
behaviour of the agents in an attempt to explain anomalous properties of
financial markets (see Thaler (2005) for a recent review). Other approaches
consist to find an empirical arbitrage opportunity and determine the optimal
investment size (Chen, Stanzl and Watanabe 2002), or to inject a controllable
amount of predictability into a toy market model and study how the traders
exploit it and remove it in order to understand theoretically the dynamical
road to efficiency (Challet, Marsili and Zhang 2000, Challet 2007).
Even the champions of EMH agree that there are temporary anomalies,
due for instance to uninformed traders (sometimes called noise traders), that
arbitrageurs tend to cancel. Thus the random walk hypothesis must be
viewed as an extreme assumption describing an average idealised behaviour
that does not describe every detail of the microscopic price dynamics. And
indeed extreme assumptions are most useful in any theoretical framework.
This is why the opposite assumption is worth considering: the discussion
will start by focusing on a single transaction and investigates how to exploit
perfect knowledge about it. Trader 0 is active at time t; he buys/sells a given
amount of shares n0, leading to (log-)price change r(t) = r0, where t is in
transaction time, t being the t-th transaction. Trader 1 is assumed to have
perfect information about t and r0, and act accordingly.
A related situation is found in Farmer (1999), which discusses the ex-
ploitation of an isolated pattern; its main result is that the pattern does not
disappear; on the contrary, its very exploitation spreads it or shift it around t.
Therefore, this work raises the question of how microscopic arbitrage removal
is possible at all. Even if such interrogation may appear as rather incongru-
ous, what follows will make it clear that assuming the absence of arbitrage
does not imply that one understand how market participants achieve it. Even
more, since the arbitrage provided by the isolated exploitable pattern still
exists and has the same intensity after having been exploited, it can be ex-
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ploited again and again; this strongly suggests the emergence of a paradox
which questions the validity of usual assumptions about price impact.
This paper aims at answering these two questions. It shows first the
need to change the way price impact and speculation are incorporated into
financial literature. Indeed the latter very often relies on two fundamental
assumptions: constant and symmetric price impact functions. The second
point is how arbitrage is removed. Most of current literature restricts its
attention to single-time price returns, without taking into account the fact
that speculation is inherently inter-temporal. This is simpler but wrong.
Indeed, one does not make money by transacting, but by holding a position,
that is, by doing mostly nothing.
Both assumptions are useful simplifications that made possible some un-
derstanding of the dynamics of market models. However, since the discussion
on arbitrage in market models is generally in discrete time, one could in prin-
ciple argue that one time step is long enough to include holding periods, but
this is inconsistent with the nature of most financial markets. Indeed, the
buy/sell orders arrive usually asynchronously in continuous time, which rules
out the possibility of synchronous trading; at a larger time scale, the presence
of widely different time scales of market participants also rules out perfect
synchronicity.
Once arbitrage exploitation is considered at its most minute temporal
level, that is, when its ineluctable inter-temporality is respected, a simple
consistency criterion for price impact functions emerges. If violated, a para-
doxical arbitrage chain exploitation is possible, or equivalently, the gain of a
money-making trader is not decreased if he informs his trusted friends of the
existence of arbitrage opportunities. A weaker consistency criterion for price
impact functions with respect to price manipulation is found in Huberman
and Stanzl (2004); the discussion, that includes the case of time-varying lin-
ear price impact functions, does not take into account the feedback of market
orders on the order book, and only indirectly the spread. As we shall see, the
presence of the spread and the dynamics of price impact functions are key
elements of consistency. A more recent and sophisticated approach studies
how to an arbitrage-free condition links the shape and memory of market
impact (Gatheral 2009).
By focusing on the exploitation a single transaction isolated in time, and
by assuming that trader 1 experiences no difficulty in injecting his transac-
tions just before and after t, his risk profiles with respect to price fluctuations
and uncertain position holding period are mostly irrelevant and will be ne-
glected.
3
2 The paradox
The price impact function I(n) is by definition the relative price change
caused by a transaction of n (integer) shares (n > 0 for buying, n < 0 for
selling); mathematically,
p(t+ 1) = p(t) + I(n), (1)
where p(t) is the log-price and t is in transaction time. We shall first assume
that there is no spread, i.e. that when a market order moves the price,
the spread closes immediately; spread alone cannot solve the paradox, as
explained later.
The above notations misleadingly suggests that I does not depend on
time. In reality, not only I is subject to random fluctuations (which will be
neglected here), but also, for instance, to reactions to market order sides,
which have a long memory (see e.g. Bouchaud, Gefen, Potters and Wyart
(2004) Lillo and Farmer (2004) Bouchaud, Kockelkoren and Potters (2006)
Farmer, Gerig, Lillo and Mike (2007) for discussions about the dynamical
nature of market impact). Neglecting the dynamics of I requires us to con-
sider specific shapes for I that enforce some properties of price impact for
each transaction, whereas in reality they only hold on average. For example,
one should restrict oneself to the class of functions that makes it impossible
to obtain round-trip positive gains (Farmer 1999). But the inappropriate-
ness of constant price impact functions is all the more obvious as soon as
one considers how price predictability is removed by speculation, which is
inter-temporal by nature.
The most intuitive (but wrong) view of market inefficiency is to regard
price predictability as a scalar deviation from the unpredictable case: if there
were a relative price deviation r0 caused by a transaction of n0 shares at some
time t. According to this view, one should exchange n1 shares so as to cancel
perfectly this anomaly, where n1 is such that I(n1) = −r0. This view amounts
to regarding predictability as something that can be remedied with a single
trade. However, the people that would try and cancel r0 would not gain
anything by doing it unless they are market makers who try to stabilise the
price. The speculators on the other hand make money by opening, holding,
and closing positions. Hence one needs to understand the mechanisms of
arbitrage removal by the speculators.
Trader 1, a perfectly (and possibly illegally) informed speculator, will take
advantage of his knowledge by opening a position at time t − 1 and closing
it at time t + 1. It is important to be aware that if one places an order at
time t, the transaction takes place at price p(t + 1). Provided that trader 0
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buys/sells n0 shares irrespective of the price that he obtains, the round-trip
of trader 1 yields a monetary gain of
g1 = n1[e
p(t+2) − ep(t)] = n1e
p0[eI(n0) − eI(n1)]. (2)
and a relative gain of
gˆ1 =
n1[e
p(t+2) − ep(t)]
n1ep(t)
= eI(n0)−I(n1) − 1, (3)
where p0 is the log-price before any trader considered here makes a transac-
tion. Since I(n) generally increases with n, there is an optimal n∗1 number
of shares that maximises g1. The discussion so far is a simplification, in
real-money instead of log-money space, of the one found in Farmer (1999).
One should note that the intervention of trader 1 does not reduce price pre-
dictability (see Fig. 1). Assuming that |r1| is equal to the market volatility,
a straightforward computation shows that trader 1’s actions increase the
volatility measured in {t− 1, t, t + 1} by a factor 9/8, thereby reducing the
signal-to-noise ratio around t. Therefore, in the framework of constant price
impact functions, an isolated arbitrage opportunity never vanishes but be-
comes less and less exploitable because of the fluctuations, thus the reduction,
of signal-to-noise ratio caused by the speculators.
It seems that trader 1 cannot achieve a better gain than by holding n∗1
shares at time t. Since the actions of trader 1 do not modify in any way
the arbitrage opportunity between t − 2 and t + 2, he can inform a fully
trusted friend, trader 2, of the gain opportunity on the condition that the
latter opens his position before t− 1 and closes it after t + 1 so as to avoid
modifying the relative gain of trader 1.1 For instance, trader 2 informs trader
1 when he has opened his position and trader 1 tells trader 2 when he has
closed his position. From the point of view of trader 2, this is very reasonable
because the resulting action of trader 1 is to leave the arbitrage opportunity
unchanged to r0 since p(t+1)−p(t−1) = r0. Trader 2 will consequently buy
n∗2 = n
∗
1 shares at time t − 2 and sell them at time t + 2, earning the same
return as trader 1. This can go on until trader i has no other fully trusted
friend. Note that the advantage of trader 1 is that he holds a position over
a smaller time interval, thereby increasing his return rate; in addition, since
trader 2 increases the opening price of trader 1, which results into a prefactor
eI(n2) in Eq. (10), the absolute monetary gain of trader 1 actually increases
provided that he has enough capital to invest. Before explaining why this
1If trader 2 were not a good friend, trader 1 could in principle ask trader 2 to open
his position after him and to close it after him, thus earning more. But relationships with
real friends are supposed to egalitarian in this paper.
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Figure 1: Price time dynamics around t when trader 1 exploits his knowledge
about r0. This figure is readily generalised to the case of trader 1 and his
friends exploiting r0.
situation is paradoxical, it makes sense to emphasise that the gains of traders
i > 0 are of course obtained at the expense of trader 0, and that the result
the particular order of the traders’ actions is to create a bubble which peaks
at time t+ 1.
The paradox is the following: if trader 1 is alone, the best return that
can be extracted from his perfect knowledge is gˆ1(n
∗
1) according to the above
reasoning. When there are N traders in the ring of trust, the total return
extracted is N times the optimal gain of a single trader. Now, assume that
trader 1 has two brokering accounts; he can use each of his accounts, respect-
ing the order in which to open and close his positions, effectively earning the
optimal return on each of his accounts. The paradox is that his actions would
be completely equivalent to investing n∗1 and then n
∗
1 from the same account.
In particular, in the case of I(n) = n, this seems a priori exactly similar to
grouping the two transactions into 2n∗1, but this results of course in a return
smaller than the optimal return for a doubled investment. Hence, in this
framework, trader 1 can earn as much as pleases provided that he splits his
investment into sub-parts of n∗1 shares whatever I is, as long as it is constant.
Two criticisms can be raised. First, the ring of trust must be perfect for
this scheme to work, otherwise a Prisoner’s dilemma arises, as it is advan-
tageous for trader i + 1 to defect and close his position before trader i. In
that case, the expected return for each trader is of order 1/N , as in Farmer
(1999).
But more importantly, one may expect that the above discussion relies
crucially on the fact that r0 does not depend on the actual price, or equiv-
alently that trader 0 wishes to buy or to sell a predetermined number of
shares. As we shall see in the second part of this paper, the paradox still
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exists even if trader 0 has a fixed budget C (which is more likely to arise if
trader 0 intends to buy).
But this paradox seems too good to be present in real markets. As a
consequence, one should rather consider its impossibility as an a contrario
consistency criterion for price impact functions. The final part of this paper
explores the dynamics of price impact functions and the role of the spread
in ensuring consistency, which is then tested in real markets.
3 Finite capital
When trader 0 has a finite capital, the number of shares that he can buy
decreases when traders 1, 2, . . . increase the share price before his transaction.
Let us assume that trader 0 has capital C that buys n0 shares at price e
p0.
The price he obtains is different from ep0 because of his impact: the real
quantity of shares that C can buy is therefore self-consistently determined
by
n
(0)
0 =
n0
eI(n
(0)
0 )
. (4)
We shall first focus on the case where the self impact is neglected, or equiv-
alently where trader 0 has a restricted budget with flexible constraint since
it is leads to simpler mathematical expressions.
When only trader 1 is active before trader 0, n0 becomes n
(1)
0 = n0/e
I(n1),
thus the gain of trader 1 is
g1/e
p0 = n1[e
I(n0/eI(n1)) − eI(n1)]. (5)
It is easy to convince oneself that there is always an n∗1 ≥ 1 provided
that n0 is large enough: solving ∂g1/∂n1 = 0 and setting n1 = 1 gives the
corresponding n0. Using the shortcut ρ = e
I(1),
eI(n0/ρ)
[
1−
n0
ρ2
I ′(1)I ′(n0/ρ)
]
− ρ[1 + I ′(1)] = 0 (6)
The existence of a solution to this equation is intuitive: when n0 = 0, the
left hand side is negative; since the second l.h.s term does not depend on
n0, one is left to show that the first l.h.s term grows fast enough with n0
so that its parenthesis does vanish. Since I ′(x) is assumed to be small in
financial markets, the second l.h.s term is close to 1. Now, assuming that
I(x) grows at least as fast as a log x, the first term always gives a solution.
The case I(x) ∝ log x is dealt with explicitly in the next subsection. At the
other end of the spectrum of usual price impact functions, the linear case
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I(x) = λx cannot be solved exactly, but assuming that λ ≪ 1 and perusing
eI(x) ≃ 1 + λx, one finds n0 ≃
1+λ
2λ2
, which deviates by about 3% from the
numerical solution for λ = 0.01.
Trader 1 must now be careful when communicating the existence of the
arbitrage to trader 2, since the latter decreases the price return caused by
trader 0. Indeed, assuming that trader 1 invests n∗1 whatever trader 2 does,
his gain is given by
g1,2(n
∗
1, n2)/e
p0 = n∗1[e
I(n2)+I(n0/e
I(n∗1)+I(n2)) − eI(n2)+I(n
∗
1)]. (7)
He would therefore lose ∆g1(n2) = g
∗
1 − g1,2(n
∗
1, n2), which must be compen-
sated for by trader 2. Without compensation payment, the gain of the latter
is
g2/e
p0 = n2[e
I(n0/e
I(n∗1)+I(n2)) − eI(n2)]. (8)
The case where trader 0 has a strict budget constraint is obtained by replacing
n0 by n
(0)
0 in Eqs (5), (7) and (8).
The paradox exists if trader 2 has a positive total gain, i.e., G2 = g2 −
∆g1 > 0. In order to investigate when this is the case, one must resort to
particular examples of price impact functions.
Empirical research showed that I is a non-linear, concave function (Hasbrouck
1991, Kempf and Korn 1992, Lillo, Farmer and Mantegna 2003, Bouchaud
and Potters 2003, Rosenow 2005). Although there is no consensus on its
shape, logarithms and power- laws are possible candidates. From a mathe-
matical point of view, logarithmic functions allow for explicit computations,
while power-laws must be investigated numerically.
3.1 Log price impact functions
The generic impact function that will be studied is I(|x|) = sign(x)γ log |λx|;
when λ > 1, a transaction of one share results in a price change; the number
of shares will be rescaled so as to contain λ, which shorten the mathematical
expressions. The parameter γ ≪ 1 is related to the liquidity and brings
down the impact to reasonable levels: if x = 100 and γ = 0.01, the price is
increased by about 5%.
For the sake of comparison, we first address the case of infinite capital:
the optimal number of shares to invest by traders 1 and 2 is
n∗1 =
n0
(γ + 1)1/γ
, (9)
which simplifies to n0/2 if γ = 1, and tends to n0/e
1+γ/2 in the limit of small
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Figure 2: Region where the paradox exists (n∗2 > 1) in parameter space (n0,
γ). Logarithmic impact, finite capital with flexible constraint (continuous
line) and strict constraint (dashed line).
γ. The optimal monetary gain is given by
g∗1 = e
p0nγ+10
γ
(γ + 1)1+1/γ
. (10)
In the case of finite capital, the optimal number of shares to invest for
trader 1 is
n∗1 = [n
γ
0(1− γ)]
1
γ(γ+1) ; (11)
The optimal gain is given by
g∗1 = e
p0n0
γ
(1− γ)1−1/γ
= C
γ
(1− γ)1−1/γ
, (12)
which is linear in n0, in contrast to its super-linearity in Eq (10): the limited
budget of trader 0 helps to remove predictability.
The gain of trader 1 in the presence of trader 2 is
g1,2(n
∗
1, n2) = e
p0n0(1− γ)
1/γ
(
1
(1− γ)nγ
2
2
− 1
)
; (13)
he therefore would lose
∆g1(n2) = g
∗
1 − g1,2(n
∗
1, n2) = e
p0n0(1− γ)
1/γ−1
[
1−
1
nγ
2
2
]
. (14)
Trader 2 optimises
G2
ep0
= [g2 −∆g1]e
−p0 =
[
n0
1− γ
] γ
(γ+1)
n1−γ
2
2 − n
1+γ
2 −∆g1(n2) (15)
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with respect to n2. The paradox survives in the regions of the parameter
space such that G2 > 0
∗ and n∗2 > 1. Numerical investigations show that
G∗2 > 0 is always true. From Fig. 2 one sees that the paradox exists provided
that scaled n0 is large enough (λn0 > e
1+γ/2 for γ ≪ 1) and γ small enough,
which is compatible with all realistic values. Note that g∗1 and G
∗
2 are in-
creasing functions of γ, since this parameter tunes the price return caused
by n
(1)
0 and n
(2)
0 .
If trader 0 has a strict budget, the number of shares he can afford is
determined self-consistently by n
(0)
0 = C/e
p0+γ logn
(0)
0 without the intervention
of the trader 1, that is, n
(0)
0 = n
1/(γ+1)
0 ; after trader 1 has opened his position,
trader 0 can only afford
n
(1)
0 = n
(0)
0 /n
γ/(γ+1)
1 =
[
n0
nγ1
] 1
γ+1
(16)
shares. Similarly,
n∗1 = n
1
2γ+1
0
[
1− γ2/(γ + 1)
γ + 1
] γ+1
γ(2γ+1)
, (17)
hence the number of shares to invest is lowered further in comparison with
Eq (11). All the expressions of the respective gains of trader 1 and 2 do
not simplify to neat and short expressions and no analytical solution to the
maximisation of G2 can be found. Numerical maximisation yields the dashed
boundary line in Fig. 2. The strict constraint increases the minimum n0
needed for making the paradox possible when γ is small enough. At γ ≃ 0.66,
the boundary lines cross; this may be due to the fact that trader 2 must pay
a smaller compensation to trader 1 when γ increases.
3.2 Power-law impact functions
Several papers suggest a power-law price impact function I(x) = signx|x/λ|β
with λ ≥ 1 and β ∈ [0.3, 0.8] (Plerou, Gopikrishnan, Gabaix and Stanley
2004, Rosenow 2005, Lillo et al. 2003); for the sake of simplicity (and without
loss of generality) the volumes x will be rescaled by λ from now on; this means
that the consistency conditions are now G2 > 0 and n2 > 0. With this choice
of functions, it is not possible to maximise explicitly g1 and G2.
Performing all the maximisations of the finite capital case numerically,
one finds that the picture of the log impact function is still valid in this case
(see Fig. 3): realistic values of (scaled) n0 are small, hence they always fall
into the region of inconsistency, in particular for I(x) ∝ x. Interestingly,
10
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Figure 3: Region where the optimal gain of trader 2 is positive in the (scaled)
n0, β space. Power-law impact function and finite capital.
this is the most common choice in the literature on agent-based models,
option pricing, etc. It was derived analytically by Kyle (1985) under the
assumption of linearity between private information and insiders’ order flow.
More recently, Farmer (1999) uses it as simple example of a function that
prevents making trading profits from a round trip. And certainly, it may
seem the least arbitrary, since it does not seem to impose any particular
choice of β. Hence constant I(x) ∝ x is to be banished. But power-laws are
inconsistent for all possible real-market values of β; once again, this shows
that constant price impact functions are to be avoided.
4 Feedback
A possible way out from inconsistent price impact functions is to take into
account the dynamics of the order book, particularly the reaction of the
order book to a sequence of market orders of the same kind. Generically, the
impact of a second market order of the same kind and size is smaller than
that of the first one, and similarly for a third one. For our purpose, we shall
assume that a second market order of the same size and type has an impact
described by I1(n) = κ1I(n) with 0 < κ1 < 1, the third I2(n) = κ2κ1I(n), etc
(Wyart, Bouchaud, Kockelkoren, Potters and Vettorazzo 2006, Farmer et al.
2007). To this contraction of market impact on one side also corresponds
an increase of market impact on the other side for the next market order of
opposite type (Wyart et al. 2006); therefore, we shall assume that the impact
function on the other side is divided by θ1 after the first market order, by
θ2θ1 after the second, etc. As shown in the next section, κ1 ≃ κ2 is a very
good approximation when κ1 and κ2 are averaged over all the stocks, hence
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we shall assume κ1 = κ2 = κ; for the same reason, we assume that θ1 =
θ2 = θ. The hypothesis that the contractions of the price impact functions
correspond to multiplying I for each new market order makes this process
Markovian. While it is now well established that order books and order flows
are not Markovian but display long memory (Farmer et al. 2007, Bouchaud,
Kockelkoren and Potters 2004)2, this may seem a step back. However since
we only consider a few time steps, the long memory of the order book is of
little importance for the present discussion.
When writing the gains of trader 1 and 2, one must be very careful with
the order of the transactions. Starting with the case of infinite capital of
trader 0, the gain of trader 1 is
g1 = n1[e
I(n1)+κI(n0)−I(n1)/θ2 − eI(n1)], (18)
which makes it clear that there is still a non-zero optimal number of shares
n∗1 to invest. Similarly, the gain g1,2 is now
g1,2 = n
∗
1[e
I(n2)+κI(n∗1)+κ
2I(n0)−I(n∗1)/θ
3
− eI(n2)+κI(n
∗
1)], (19)
while that of trader 2, without his payment to trader 1 is
g2 = n2(e
I(n2)+κI(n∗1)+κ
2I(n0)−I(n∗1)/θ
3−κI(n2)/θ2 − eI(n2)). (20)
4.1 Feedback on market order side only
In order to investigate whether the feedback on the side on which the first
sequential market orders are placed is enough to make price impact consis-
tent, one sets θ = 1. In the case of log price impact functions, the optimal
number of shares and gain of trader 1 are
n∗1 =
nκ0
(γ + 1)1/γ
(21)
and
g∗1 = e
p0n
κ(γ+1)
0
γ
(γ + 1)1+1/γ
. (22)
These two equations already show that the reaction of the limit order book
reduces the gain opportunity of player 1. Adding trader 2 will reduce further
2A discussion about why Markovian models such as Madhavan, Richardson and
Roomans (1997) are inherently inadequate to describe real order book dynamics is found
in (Wyart et al. 2006)
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Figure 4: Regions in which the optimal gain of trader 2 is positive and in
which the number of shares invested by trader 1 is larger than 1. Logarithmic
impact, infinite capital, and feedback on market orders side only (κ = 0.5).
the impact of trader 0, hence the gain of trader 1, and, as before, trader 2
should pay for it. In this case, the reduction of gain of trader 1 is
∆g1
ep0
= [g∗1 − g1(n
∗
1, n2)]e
−p0 = n
κ(γ+1)
0
γ
(γ + 1)1+1/γ
−nγ2
n
γ(1+κγ)
0
(γ + 1)1/γ+κ
[n
−γκ(1−κ)
0 (γ + 1)− 1], (23)
while the gain that trader 2 optimises is
G2
ep0
= nγ+12

 1
nκγ2
n
κγ(2κ−1)
0
(1 + γ)κ−1
− 1

− ∆g1
ep0
. (24)
Trader 1’s impact functions are κI when he opens his position and I when
he closes it, which is an additional cause of loss for trader 1, which must be
also compensated for by trader 2. Fortunately for the latter, his impact
functions are I when opening and κI when closing his position. Therefore,
provided that κ is large enough so as not to make the impact of the trader
0 κ2I(n0) too small, trader 2 can earn more than trader 1 in some circum-
stances.
As above, impact functions are inconsistent when G∗2 > 0, n
∗
1 > 1 and
n∗2 > 1 for log impact functions. It turns out that the regions in which G
∗
2 > 0
while n∗1 > 1 are disjoint if κ < κc ≃ 0.5 for log impact functions (Fig. 4).
The case of power-law impact functions shows a similar transition: since
n0 is rescaled, the realistic region to consider is limited to n0 ≪ 1, for which
the region G∗2 > 0 vanishes when κ < κc ≃ 0.78 (Fig. 5).
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Figure 5: Regions of parameter space where the optimal gain of trader 2 (G∗2)
is positive (above the respective line). Power-law impact functions, feedback
with infinite capital. From top to bottom κ = 0.75, 0.78, 0.8 and 0.83.
1 10
n0
0.001
0.01
0.1
γ
n1
*
 > 1
G
2*
 
>
 0
Figure 6: Regions in which the optimal gain of trader 2 is positive and in
which the number of shares invested by trader 1 is larger than 1. Logarithmic
impact, infinite capital, and feedback on both sides (κ = 0.83)
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Figure 7: Regions in which the optimal gain of trader 2 is positive (above
the respective line). Power-law impact, infinite capital, and feedback on both
sides; from top to bottom: κ = 0.91 (black line), κ = 0.92 (red line), κ = 0.93
(green line).
4.2 Feedback on both sides
We shall assume that θ1 = θ2 = κ in order to be able to use market data.
Generalising the above calculations is straightforward. As an example, for
log price impact functions,
n∗1 = n
κ3
0
[
1− γ(1/κ2 − 1)
1 + γ
]κ2/γ
. (25)
Once again, more feedback results in a smaller exponent of n0. As a conse-
quence, Fig. 6 shows that the critical value of κ is slightly larger than 0.83 for
log price impact functions all γ: indeed only a small area of inconsistent im-
pact functions, corresponding to n0 ≃ 1.5, still exists but cannot be reached
since both n0 = 1 and 2 are outside of the inconsistent region. The effect of
feedback on power-law price impact functions is stronger (see Fig. 7): when
κ < 0.92, (scaled), only power-laws with exponent larger than about 0.5
(this includes linear and super-linear impact functions) are inconsistent for
reasonable values of n0. Therefore, even double feedback does not guarantee
consistency
5 Empirical data
The values of κ1 and κ2 can be measured in real markets. The response func-
tion R(δt, V ) = 〈(p(t+ δt)− p(t))ǫ(t)|V (t) = V 〉 is the average mid-price
change after δt trades, conditional on the sign of the trade ǫ(t) and on volume
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Figure 8: Empirical distribution of κ1 (black circles) and κ2 (red squares) of
68 stocks of Paris Stock Exchange in 2002. Inset: κ2 vs κ1 for all the stocks
V ; similarly, one defines the response function conditional on two trades of
the same sign R+(δt, V ) = 〈(p(t+ δt)− p(t))ǫ(t)|V (t) = V, ǫ(t) = ǫ(t− 1)〉,
andR++(δt, V ) = 〈(p(t+ δt)− p(t))ǫ(t)|V (t) = V, ǫ(t) = ǫ(t− 1) = ǫ(t− 2)〉.
A key finding of Bouchaud, Gefen, Potters and Wyart (2004) and Bouchaud
et al. (2006) is that R factorises into R(δt)F (V ). Thus we will be interested
in R(δt), R+(δt) and R++(δt).
Using measures kindly provided by J.-Ph. Bouchaud and J. Kockelkoren
taken on one year of data about all the order books of Paris Stock Ex-
change, one finds that the estimate κˆ of κ, defined as κˆ = 〈R+(1)〉/〈R(1)〉 ∈
[0.86, 1.02], that the average over all stocks κˆ1 = 0.97 ± 0.04 and κˆ2 =
〈R++(1)〉/〈R+(1)〉 ∈ [0.87, 1.01], while κˆ2 = 0.97 ± 0.03. (see Fig. 8); for a
given stock, there is some correlation between κ1 and κ2 (see inset of Fig. 8);
the data presented here does not contain error bars for the measures of R,
R+ and R++. The approximation κ1 ≃ κ2 is reasonable, and we shall from
now on call κ = (κ1+κ2)/2 and replace κ1 and κ2 by κ everywhere. It should
be noted that since one considers the mid-price reaction to a market order,
in principle, the measured values of R, R+, and R++ include the spread.
However, because κ is the ratio between two of them, this effect cancels out.3
In other words there is some variations between the stocks, some of them
3Mathematically, if a(t) and b(t) denote the ask and bid prices, m(t) = (a + b)(t)/2.
Hence, focusing on a buy market order of size Vt at time t and assuming that it leaves
b(t) unchanged, m(t + 1) − m(t) = (a′ − a)(t + 1)/2. If a′(t) = a(t) + Q(t)F (V (t)),
m(t + 1) −m(t) = Q(t)F (V (t))/2, where Q is the function that describes the impact of
this precise trade and contains all the memory and state of the ask order book at time
t; now κ1 is nothing else than 〈
Q(t)
Q(t−1) 〉|ǫ(t)=ǫ(t−1),V (t)=V (t−1); the fact that one takes the
ratio of R and R+ removes the factor 1/2 (a similar argument holds for κ1); this ensures
that the spread is not taken into account in the measurement of κ1 and κ2.
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Figure 10: Fraction of daily volume needed to inject an exploitable arbitrage
versus κ (same data set)
being less sensitive to successive market orders of the same kind. The values
of estimated κ start at 0.86. Therefore, even feedback on both book sides
does not yield consistent log impact functions, but do if the impact functions
are power-laws with small exponents. One concludes that the feedback of
the order book is not enough to make price impact functions consistent.
6 Spread without feedback, infinite capital
The above discussion neglects the bid-ask spread s. It is however of great
importance in practice, as the impact of one trade is on average of the same
order of magnitude as the spread (Wyart et al. 2006). This means that n0
must be large enough in order to make the knowledge of trader 1 valuable.
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Assuming that the spread is equal to 〈s〉 at all times, Eq. (5) generalises to
g1
ep0
= n1
[
eI(n0)−〈s〉 − eI(n1)
]
. (26)
Thus, replacing n0 by n
′
0 = I
−1[I(n0) + 〈s〉] leads to the same equations as
before. For example, in the case of log impact functions, n′0 = n0e
−
〈s〉
γ and
the optimal number of shares that trader 1 should invest is
n∗1,s =
n0e
−〈s〉/γ
(1 + γ)1/γ
(27)
and his optimal gain is given multiplied by e−
1+γ
γ
〈s〉 ≃ e−
〈s〉
γ . Since 〈s〉/γ ∼ 10
in practice, the minimal amount of shares needed to create an arbitrage,
denoted by n0,min is increased (and his gain divided) about 20,000 folds by
the spread. Straightforward calculations show that replacing n0 by n
′
0 holds
for all the equations investigated in previous subsections.
The respective values of γ and 〈s〉 are not independent, and can be mea-
sured in real markets for a given stock. In the language of Bouchaud, Gefen,
Potters and Wyart (2004), γ = 〈log(n)〉/R(1) where 〈log(n)〉 is the average
of the logarithm of transaction size and R(1) is the response function after
one time step. Using γ and 〈s〉 measured in Paris Stock Exchange one finds
that n0,min ∈ [1.210
4, 2.0108], with median of 1.2105 (Fig. 9), which is not
irrealistic for very liquid stocks. Indeed, the fraction of n0,min with respect to
the average daily volume of each stock ranges from ≃ 2% to more than 100%,
with a median of about 42%. Therefore, for most of the stocks, trader 0 needs
to trade less than two fifths of the daily average volume in one transaction in
order to be leave an exploitable arbitrage; for 12 stocks (18%), trading less
than 10% of the average daily volume suffices. It is unlikely that a single
trade is larger than the average daily volume, hence, 29 stocks (43%) do not
allow on average a single large trade to be exploitable by a simple round-trip.
Interestingly, stocks with average daily volumes smaller than about 105 are
all consistent from that point of view (Fig. 9). In addition, the stocks for
which n0,min < 〈V 〉 all have a κ > 0.945.
Therefore, the role of the spread is to increase considerably the minimum
size of the trade, which in some cases remain within reasonable bounds.
Therefore, the spread must be taken into account, but does not yield sys-
tematically consistent impact functions for some stocks with a high enough
daily volume.
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7 Spread and feedback, infinite capital
The question is whether the feedback and the spread make impact function
systematically consistent. The stocks that are the most likely to become
consistent are those whose n0,min/〈V 〉 < 1 is large while having a strong
feedback. According to Fig. 10, these properties are compatible.
Using for each stock 〈s〉, κ, and γ from the data, we find that three
additional stocks (ALS, IFG, SCO) are made consistent by feedback on trader
0’s market order side alone: the feedback limited to one side of the order book,
even when the spread is taken into account, is insufficient. However, adding
finally the feedback on both book sides makes consistent all the stocks, even
in the case of infinite capital. Therefore, both the spread and the feedback
on both sides of the order book are crucial ingredients of consistency at the
smallest time scale.
8 Discussion
The paradox proposed in this paper provides an a contrario simple and nec-
essary condition of consistency for price impact functions. This condition is
verified for all the stocks of Paris Stock Exchange in 2002. Indeed, the main
finding of this paper is that financial markets ensure consistent market price
impact functions on average at the most microscopic dynamical level by two
essential ingredients: the spread and the dynamics of the order book on both
sides of the order book.
The fact that non-constant price impact functions with feedback are
needed to achieve consistency at the smallest time scale for more than half of
the stocks means that financial literature that assumes constant price impact
functions must be critically reviewed in this light. This paper is not the first
to suggest it (see e.g (Bouchaud, Gefen, Potters and Wyart 2004, Bouchaud
et al. 2006, Lillo et al. 2003, Farmer et al. 2007)), but advocates it from logical
evidence: for instance Huberman and Stanzl (2004) shows that if the price
impact is permanent, only linear impact functions prevent quasi-arbitrage,
but recognises the paradox that real-market price impact functions are not
linear, therefore suspects the need for time-dependent impact functions. The
approach of the present paper remains Markovian, which is justified when
restricting one’s attention to the smallest time scale and a few transactions
only. However, in general, the long memory of the side of limit order mar-
kets must be compensated in a subtle way by the price impact functions
(see e.g. Bouchaud et al. (2006) and Farmer et al. (2007)). This raises the
crucial issue of how to incorporate in a tractable way non-constant impacts
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in microstructure and agent-based modelling.
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